

## CHAPTER 4

# Anselm: Free Will and Moral Responsibility

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Sometimes an interpretive dispute is no more than that; nothing more is at stake than how one understands a philosopher's view of some particular topic. Sometimes, however, what looks like a dispute over some particular point of interpretation is actually something much bigger. The debate over Anselm's account of free choice is an example of the second sort of dispute. On the surface, it is no more than a debate about whether Anselm had a hierarchical understanding of will; but, when we probe more deeply, we find underlying disputes about the ways in which, and the purposes for which, the history of philosophy ought to be pursued, as well as about the proper role of philosophical assessment in philosophical historiography.

Many interpreters of medieval philosophy are taken with Harry Frankfurt's account of the hierarchical structure of the will (Frankfurt 1971), finding Frankfurtianism in authors as disparate as Augustine and Aquinas. Most recently, the Frankfurtians have erroneously claimed Anselm for their cause. But Anselm does not recognize a hierarchy of first- and second-order desires in the will, and (consequently) he does not analyze the will's freedom in terms of the relation between first- and second-order desires. I shall argue against the Frankfurtian reading on three grounds: textual, philosophical, and historiographical: The Frankfurtian reading relies on tendentious textual analysis and troubling eisegesis; it destroys whatever is philosophically attractive in Anselm's view and leaves him unable to answer the very questions that motivate his interest in free choice; and it represents an abuse of philosophical historiography.

## The Textual Case

Before I turn to my main task, I must lay out a few important matters of definition. Let us understand a first-order desire as a desire whose object is not itself a desire or will, and a second-order desire as a desire whose object is a desire or will. This is a broader definition than either Frankfurt or his acolytes typically give—they generally define first-order desires as desires to perform an action—but the broader definition is considerably more useful. For example, my desire to escape censure for an intemperate outburst, my desire to be a successful teacher, and my desire for a widespread return to eastward-facing celebrations of the Eucharist may, under suitable circumstances, lead me to perform a particular action; but just as such they are not desires to perform any action. Yet they certainly seem to be first-order desires—they're desires, after all, and their objects are not other desires, so what else should we call them? (I'll come back to this.) When a desire is effective, we call it a volition. A first-order volition, then, is a first-order desire that produces an action; and a second-order volition is a second-order desire that produces a conforming first-order volition.<sup>1</sup> Persons have freedom of the will, Frankfurt argues, when they are able to have the wills they want to have: that is, when they are able to have first-order volitions that conform to their second-order volitions. And persons act freely when they act from first-order volitions that conform to their second-order volitions.

I can now turn to an analysis of the texts of Anselm on which the Frankfurtian reading ostensibly rests. This part of the paper is complicated by the fact that the two interpretations I'm considering impose the alien Frankfurtian scheme on Anselm's texts in very different ways. Stan R. Tyvoll (2006) identifies both of the fundamental inclinations of the will, the affection for justice and the affection for advantage, as second-order desires. Katherin A. Rogers (2008), by contrast, makes the affection for justice a second-order desire and resolves the affection for advantage into a plurality of first-order desires.<sup>2</sup>

I shall begin with one key passage on which both authors rely. The passage is from *Harmony* 3.11:

'Will', in fact, appears to be said equivocally. It has three senses: the instrument for willing, the affection of the instrument, and the uses of that instrument. The instrument for willing is the power of the soul that we employ for willing, just as reason is the instrument for reasoning that we employ when we reason and sight is the instrument for seeing that we employ when we see. The affection of this instrument is that by which the instrument itself is disposed in such a way to will something (even when one is not thinking of what it wills) that if that thing comes to mind, the instrument wills it, either immediately or at the appropriate time. . . . And the use of that instrument is what we have only when we think of the thing we will.

There is no dispute here that by the “instrument for willing” Anselm is talking about the will itself. Nor is there any unclarity about “the uses of that instrument,” which Tyvoll, Rogers, and I agree are particular occurrent first-order desires. Our interpretations part company over the second sense of “will,” “that by which the instrument itself is disposed,” and over how to understand the contrast between the second sense and the third sense. I argue that the dispositions or affections of the will – there are at bottom just two, Anselm tells us later in this passage: one for willing advantage and one for willing rectitude – are general dispositional desires, whereas the uses of the will are particular occurrent desires. Tyvoll and Rogers say, however, that the contrast Anselm intends is between second-order and first-order desires. Though the two authors differ in their understanding of the disposition for willing advantage, they agree that the disposition for willing rectitude is a second-order desire. For Tyvoll, “the inclination for uprightness is . . . a second-order desire for morally upright first-order volitions” (Tyvoll 2006, 159). Rogers, who prefers to translate *voluntas* in its second sense as “desire,” claims that the “desire for justice” is “a second order desire that one’s first order desires for benefits should be properly ordered, should be as they ought to be” (Rogers 53).

I shall look first at the evidence Tyvoll offers in favor of the claim that the affection for justice is a second-order desire. So far as I can find, his entire case for reading the two affections as second-order desires is found in the following paragraph, which I quote in full:

What sort of desires are the inclinations? Clearly, they are not desires for specific actions; they are neither first-order desires nor first-order volitions. For it is through the inclinations that first-order desires and volitions come about. Rather, the inclinations are desires of the second order; they are second-order volitions. So, for example, Anselm refers to the inclination for happiness as the “will” (*voluntas*) for “willing benefit” (*ad volendum commodum*), and to the inclination for uprightness as the “will” (*voluntas*) for “willing uprightness” (*ad volendum rectitudinem*). Hence, each inclination is a second-order desire for a will, and when effective, a second-order volition.

(Tyvoll 2006, 159)

This is an exceptionally weak case. First, from the fact that the affections are not desires for specific actions, it does not follow that they are not first-order desires or first-order volitions. One can have a first-order desire for something general or abstract. One might desire a successful career without yet having decided which career to pursue or how exactly to pursue it. One might desire health without desiring to take any particular concrete steps toward achieving or attaining it. These are “not desires for specific actions,” to use Tyvoll’s

words, but they are all first-order desires; their objects are possible goods or states of affairs, not other desires.

The fact that Tyvold speaks here of “desires for specific actions” suggests that he may have succumbed to a false dichotomy. If (contrary to my earlier arguments) one insists on restricting the label “first-order desire” to desires to perform particular actions, the affections of the will will not be first-order desires. But we cannot immediately conclude that they are second-order desires, as if that were the only other option. For in addition to first-order desires to perform particular actions, and second-order desires to have a certain kind of will, there will be these other, general desires, which are not desires to perform particular actions but nonetheless have as their objects possible goods or states of affairs, not other desires.

Tyvold offers a second reason for thinking that the affections of the will are second-order desires: “it is through the inclinations that first-order desires and volitions come about.” But this reason is no better, since not every desire through which a first-order desire comes about is a second-order desire. Suppose I desire a successful career. Finding upon reflection that I have no talent for anything but philosophy, I come to have the desire to study philosophy. My first-order desire to study philosophy derives from my desire for a successful career; but the latter desire is, as I have already argued, itself a first-order desire. This is no contrived example, but exactly the kind that Anselm himself uses again and again to explain how will-as-use derives from will-as-affection. For example, in *On the Fall of the Devil* 12–13 Anselm explains that an angel who had only the affection for happiness would be moved thereby to will whatever particular goods he might think of as means to or constituents of happiness.

Rogers’s case for the Frankfortian reading emerges primarily from her elucidation of Anselm’s definition of free choice as the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake, because, she says, “a careful unpacking will reveal the hierarchical framework he proposes for created freedom.”<sup>3</sup> She writes:

The horse which wants to go graze is willing what it ought. And the dog which loves its puppies or the master who is good to it possesses rightness of will. Clearly rightness of will here does not connote moral rectitude or uprightness. Anselm explains that lower animals are not capable of justice because they do not *recognize* and *choose* to have rightness of will, rather they simply have it by nature. To put this in contemporary terms, borrowed from Frankfurt, according to Anselm the horse and the dog possess and act upon the proper first order desires, but they cannot step back to a higher level and evaluate and endorse those desires. They cannot form second order volitions *about* their own desires.<sup>4</sup>

To begin with Rogers’s last point: There is nothing about stepping back, evaluating, and endorsing desires in either of the examples from Anselm she invokes

here (the horse from *On Truth* 12, the dog from *On Freedom of Choice* 13). Indeed, there is hardly anything about stepping back, evaluating, and endorsing desires anywhere in Anselm. This is a point that can hardly be overemphasized. It is an important part of Frankfurt's philosophical agenda that personhood involves a certain capacity for reflection on and criticism of one's own motives and desires. This is why Frankfurt will talk about persons as "identifying with" certain of their first-order desires and not with others. Rogers's book is full of such language. But this is simply not Anselm's agenda. Though no doubt human rationality as Anselm understands it does give us the capacity to reflect on our desires, Anselm never attributes human freedom to our capacity for taking up some cognitive or volitional stance toward them.

If what's distinctive about human beings isn't our ability to "step back, evaluate, and endorse" our desires, what is? The two passages to which Rogers alludes in the paragraph I've quoted give two complementary aspects of Anselm's answer. Anselm uses the example of the horse in *On Truth* 12 to draw a contrast between two different ways in which a creature might preserve rectitude. Rational creatures can deserve praise for preserving rectitude because they can "perceive," or "know," or "be aware of" rectitude and can therefore will it; non-rational creatures such as the horse cannot know rectitude and therefore cannot will it, so they are not praiseworthy if they preserve rectitude. To be aware of rectitude is simply to be aware that a given action is right. The horse is distinguished from human beings not because it lacks a hierarchically structured will but because it lacks the capacity for beliefs of the form "I ought to  $\phi$ ." So the horse example has no tendency to show that the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake depends on a hierarchically structured will.

Anselm offers the example of the dog in *On Freedom of Choice* 13, where he comments on the significance of each element in his definition of free choice. The dog enters the picture in Anselm's commentary on the phrase "for the sake of rectitude itself." The dog preserves rectitude of will, but not for the sake of rectitude itself, because it preserves rectitude *naturally*. This example would help Rogers's case only if she could show that Anselm thinks our capacity for evaluating or endorsing our desires is what allows us to act spontaneously, rather than naturally; and there isn't the slightest bit of textual support anywhere in Anselm for that notion.

It will be helpful here to distinguish between two different senses in which Anselm uses the expression "will rectitude." In one sense, to will rectitude is to will what is in fact right. In another sense, to will rectitude is to will something under the description 'right' (or under a description under which it is right). We might speak of the first as willing rectitude *materially* and of the second as willing rectitude *formally*. I will rectitude materially when I keep my appointment because I fear reprisal; I will rectitude formally when I keep my appointment because it's the right thing to do. The fact that "willing rectitude" can

have these two senses explains why Anselm in one place affirms (*On Truth* 12), and in another places denies (*On Freedom of Choice* 13), that a non-human animal can will rectitude: it wills rectitude materially but not formally.

Up to this point Rogers has been arguing that the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake involves the power to form a second-order volition for rectitude of will; having such a second-order volition is a necessary condition for having a just will and thereby being a proper object of moral praise. She goes on to argue that a second-order volition for rectitude of will is not a *sufficient* condition for justice (see above, 52). Once again, the “second level” to which Rogers appeals here is her own invention. The vainglorious almsgiver in Anselm’s example does not “have a non-praiseworthy motive for desiring . . . the correct desires”; he has a non-praiseworthy motive for *doing the right thing* – giving alms. Even on Rogers’s own reading, the object of the vainglorious will is not a desire or a willing, but a moral fact: according to her, “he wills that he ought to will what he wills.” A more apt translation of the passage, with a bit more context to flesh out Anselm’s point, would go like this: “Someone who gives food to a starving pauper for the sake of an empty reputation wills that he be under the obligation to will what he in fact wills. For he is praised because he wills to do what he ought to” (*On Truth* 12). Anselm’s point is that this person wills what he ought to will and even wills it *because* he ought to will it (because he wills praise for doing what he ought to do, and he can’t get such praise unless he ought to do it), but he doesn’t will it *for the sake of* rectitude. There’s no hierarchy or “second level” here; there is simply the point that one can will rectitude materially without willing it formally, and this will would be a first-order volition.

The next element in Rogers’s case for the Frankfurtian reading is her analysis of Anselm’s arguments in *On the Fall of the Devil*. Anselm argues, she says, that “in order for the rational creature to gain merit . . . it must have the option to cling to or abandon justice” (see above, 52). That option in turn requires that God give rational creatures two desires: the desire for benefit and the desire for justice. We must not, however, think of benefit and justice as “two mutually exclusive sets of objects of desire” (see above, 53). For Anselm says that creatures do not will anything unless they judge it to be in some way beneficial for them (*Nam nullus vult nisi quod aliquo modo sibi putat commodum*). So Anselm must hold that all first-order desires are for benefits. The desire for justice is a second-order desire for first-order desires that conform to the dictates of justice (see above, 53).

It would take us too far afield to explain what Anselm means in this context when he says *nullus vult nisi quod aliquo modo sibi putat commodum*, but we can be quite sure that he does not mean that every choice is for the advantageous, because Anselm repeatedly denies that.<sup>5</sup> That denial is the cornerstone of his explanation of the fall of the devil: the good angels rejected something advantageous for the sake of justice, whereas the bad angels chose something

advantageous at the expense of justice. The conditions of the primal angelic choice as Anselm explains it in *On the Fall of the Devil* require that the good angels' choice to preserve rectitude of will was *not* a will for some benefit, but precisely the spurning of a benefit. Furthermore, if the good angels *had* chosen to preserve rectitude of will because they judged it to be beneficial, they would (on Anselm's view) have been preserving rectitude of will for the sake of benefit rather than for the sake of rectitude itself – and they would therefore not have been just or praiseworthy and would not have merited the gift that, Anselm tells us, God gave them as a reward for their justice.

Furthermore, Anselm repeatedly makes clear that if one wills  $x$  for the sake of rectitude, it is most proper to say that one wills not  $x$  but rectitude; and that if one wills  $y$  for the sake of benefit, it is most proper to say that one wills not  $y$  but benefit.<sup>6</sup> So the contrast between willing rectitude for its own sake and willing rectitude for the sake of some external good is, in Anselm's mind, most properly described as a contrast between willing rectitude and *not really willing rectitude at all*—not as a contrast between a second-order volition for an upright will and the lack of such a second-order volition. Note too that Anselm's whole impetus is to flatten all our willings into one level, not to create hierarchies. To will  $x$  for the sake of  $y$  is, properly speaking, to will  $y$ —not to will a will that wills  $y$ .

Moreover, Rogers is simply wrong in denying that Anselm regards justice and benefit as two different kinds of good. Just a few lines up from the words Rogers cites, Anselm says that

we commonly speak of two goods and of two evils that are contrary to them. One good is that which is called 'justice', whose contrary evil is injustice. The other good is what I think can be called 'the advantageous'; its opposite evil is the disadvantageous.<sup>7</sup>

And when Anselm discusses the two affections of the will in *Harmony* 3.11, he treats justice and advantage as alternative objects of first-order volitions and the affection for justice and the affection for advantage as parallel to each other.

### The Philosophical Case

In the course of rebutting the textual case, we have seen enough of Anselm's theory of free choice that the philosophical case can be dispatched pretty quickly. Conceptually speaking, the key objection to the Frankfurtian reading is that Frankfurt and Anselm have two very different sets of goals in mind for their theories of the will and its freedom. Frankfurt's theory is designed to secure philosophical results in which Anselm displays no interest at all, and Anselm is keen on establishing conclusions that Frankfurt's theory notoriously fails to support.

The evidence that Frankfurt and Anselm are a horrible match philosophically speaking is not hard to find in both Tyvoll and Rogers. Tyvoll, for example, begins his paper by observing that:

One advantage of the hierarchical analysis of desire and volition is that it serves to illuminate a familiar philosophical tradition in free will theory, according to which an agent is free if he is able to do or will as he wants to do or will.

(Tyvoll 2006, 161)

But that tradition is a compatibilist tradition, and Anselm is unambiguously an incompatibilist. And as Tyvoll elaborates his point about the importance of being able to will as one wants to will, the misfit between Frankfurt's view and Anselm's becomes even clearer.

Tyvoll argues that on Anselm's view, "by willing what is morally right, agents have the will that they want to have and ought to have, and they have it because they want to have it; hence they enjoy freedom of will" (Tyvoll 2006, 164). Furthermore,

someone whose first-order volitions cannot be contrary to her second-order desire for morally upright volitions (someone who is unable to sin) is freer than someone whose volitions can be contrary to that second-order desire (someone who is able to sin). The ability to sin decreases free will because it is an ability to have a will that we do not want to have.

(Ibid)

But this is simply wrong. Even if Tyvoll's interpretation of the affection for happiness as a second-order desire were correct, it would turn out that those who sin have a will they want to have, just as much as those who preserve rectitude. For according to Anselm, every sin is committed for the sake of happiness. And anyone who wills to sin for the sake of happiness has a will she wants to have, since (if Tyvoll's own interpretation is correct) she has a first-order volition for happiness that accords with the (alleged) second-order volition for happiness. Furthermore, someone who chooses justice over happiness in a situation relevantly like that of the angels would, on Tyvoll's analysis, have a will he both does and doesn't want to have: a first-order volition for justice that accords with the second-order volition for justice but conflicts with the second-order desire for happiness. So no philosophical advantage is had in reading Anselm as part of a philosophical tradition that understands freedom as the ability to have the will one wants to have; on the contrary, such a reading makes a complete hash out of Anselm's arguments.

Tyvoll also argues that the Frankfurtian reading helps makes sense of Anselm's claim that someone who cannot sin is freer than someone who can,

for such a person “is perfectly able to will and do as she wants to will and do” (Tyvoll 2006, 164). But Anselm nowhere says that such a person is freer because she has the ability to will and do as she wants to. He says such a person is freer because she *can’t lose rectitude*, or more accurately, because she has the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake in such a way that she can’t lose it. Freedom understood in that way does not require a hierarchy of second-order and first-order desires. Such a hierarchy doesn’t even help—and as Tyvoll’s analysis makes clear, the principal reason for introducing the hierarchy is to secure a conclusion that Anselm’s isn’t at all interested in.

So what *is* Anselm’s chief concern? A careful look at *On Freedom of Choice*, *On the Fall of the Devil*, and *Harmony* shows very clearly that he means to develop a theory of freedom that secures the free agent’s ultimate responsibility, both causal and moral, for sin.<sup>8</sup> Now as both Tyvoll and Rogers acknowledge, the strongest objection to Frankfurt’s theory is precisely that it fails to secure the free agent’s ultimate responsibility for his actions. Tyvoll, for example, addresses the objection that the hierarchical “mesh” between first- and second-order desires could be produced by mechanisms that clearly undermine the agent’s responsibility for the resulting action. The account of freedom must therefore

include the additional condition that the alignment is in some sense ultimately up to the agent himself. . . Hence, we must include the condition of ultimate responsibility as a supplement to the hierarchical account of Anselm’s definition of free will.

(Tyvoll 2008, 167–168)

But philosophically speaking this is completely askew. The ultimate responsibility condition isn’t just a supplemental condition to be secured by extraneous fiddling. The whole purpose of Anselm’s account of free choice is to preserve ultimate responsibility. And if one can secure ultimate responsibility without adopting a hierarchical view of the will, is there any good philosophical reason to attribute the hierarchical view to Anselm?<sup>9</sup>

I shall make one final philosophical point about how alien the Frankfurian scheme is to Anselm’s thinking. In arguing that Anselm’s version of the hierarchical view escapes various problems that beset Frankfurt’s views, Katherin Rogers accidentally supplies the conceptual wherewithal to eliminate the hierarchy altogether. Rogers notes that Frankfurt himself raises the difficulty that, theoretically speaking, there is no upper limit on the number of levels of desires. But for Anselm, she claims,

there is no threat of an infinite regress of orders of desire. God’s will is the absolute standard of value and once one, at the second level, has chosen to select one’s first-order desires against that standard, there is no

higher value to appeal to. Reflective self-evaluation is a means to the end of choosing justly, but there is no virtue in continuing beyond the second level. Moreover, it is not, on Anselm's analysis, really possible to do so. What would a third-order desire consist in? The desire to desire rightness of will for its own sake, i.e. the desire to desire justice. But, at least according to Anselm, all desires are aimed at something. What motivates this third-order desire? If it is the desire for justice, then this is really just the second-order desire reiterated.<sup>10</sup>

Notice that if she's right, her argument equally entails that the second-order desire collapses into the first-order desire. The second-order desire, according to Rogers, is supposed to be a desire to conform one's will to the requirements of justice. So we can ask what motivates this desire. If it is the desire for justice, then this is really just the first-order desire reiterated. Remember, Anselm always talks about preserving rectitude of will for its own sake—i.e., for the sake of rectitude itself. On Anselm's analysis of the *what* and the *why* of willing, willing rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude *just is* willing rectitude. We never get past the first level.

### The Historiographical Case

There are, to oversimplify the matter grossly, two basic approaches to the history of philosophy. One approach views the work of the historian of philosophy as that of a "curator in the museum of ideas," to steal a phrase from D. S. Hutchinson. The aim of the historian on this view is to dust off the accretions of misunderstanding that have accumulated on a philosopher over the centuries and display him in his pristine condition, properly labeled and catalogued, and carefully presented in his historical context. This sort of historian has no official interest—no interest *qua* historian of philosophy—in the plausibility of the views thus presented, the success of the arguments deployed to support them, or the possibility of bringing the philosopher into some contemporary discussion. The other sort of historian, by contrast, reads older philosophy in the same spirit in which the non-historian reads the current journals: as a source of ideas and arguments to advance discussions in the contemporary sphere. Let us call historians of the first sort "contextual historians" and historians of the second sort "argumentative historians."

These are two ideal types—two extremes—but a great deal of work in the history of medieval philosophy falls very close to one or the other of these two extremes. Both approaches have their uses, but both also have their characteristic abuses, failures, and besetting sins. The textual and philosophical mistakes into which the defenders of the Frankfurtian reading of Anselm have fallen represent errors to which argumentative historians are particularly prone. I do not say this by way of arguing for the superiority of contextual history, for I

am an argumentative historian myself. It would appear that Tyvoll and Rogers have yielded to the temptation, so alluring to our sort of historian, to think of philosophical or theological disputes as generic “perennial questions.” If a historian thinks of the questions we find in an author as nothing more than perennial questions, and of the available answers as nothing more than possibilities permanently residing in logical space, then why not go looking in Anselm for views that we find in contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of religion?

At the very least, it is tempting for argumentative historians to suppose that views we know from contemporary philosophy are somehow “out there” as solutions to *the* mind-body problem or *the* problem of free will or what have you. Thus, when we look at older texts that engage with *a* mind-body problem or *a* problem of free will, we both overlook the historical particularities that make it *a* problem rather than *the* (generic, perennial) problem and, consequently, expect what we find in the older texts to conform to the contours of contemporary debate. It is then no surprise to find Harry Frankfurt meeting us in the pages of Anselm.

But it *should* be a surprise. It would indeed be a thing most wonderful if a view first proposed in the context of early-1970s Anglo-American debates on the freedom of the will should be found ready-to-hand, lacking only the name of its author, in texts from the late-11th and early-12th centuries. The fact that the textual case for the Frankfurtian reading of Anselm is so weak—there simply is, as I have tried to show, nothing whatever to be said for it—suggests that this interpretive dispute is at bottom a dispute about philosophical historiography. If one finds in Harry Frankfurt a helpful tool for understanding *the* problem of free will, and one expects to find in Anselm a discussion of that very problem, for which the very same tools will be helpful in the very same way, it seems perfectly reasonable to expect to find Frankfurt in Anselm. And, as both Tyvoll and Rogers demonstrate, the texts can be made to appear to cooperate with what one expects to find. Remove that expectation, however, and the eisegesis is exposed.

## Notes

1. This is how the Frankfurtian interpreters of Anselm define second-order volitions, though Frankfurt himself defines them differently (Frankfurt 1971, 10).
2. See esp. chapter 3, “The Purpose, Definition, and Structure of Free Choice” (55–72), reprinted as chapter 3 in this volume. This discussion develops the interpretation offered in Rogers, 2005.
3. See above p. 49. I have severely abbreviated my treatment of Rogers’s reading; for a much fuller account, see my review of *Anselm on Freedom* (Williams, 2009).
4. See above p. 51 (emphasis in original).
5. Rogers (see above, p. 57) also interprets *Harmony* 3.11 as saying that we always will for the sake of benefit, because Anselm says that through the affection for advantage we always will happiness. But since the very next sentence adds that through the affection for rectitude we will rectitude, the context militates very strongly against Rogers’s interpretation.

6. Examples abound, but see in particular *On the Fall of the Devil* 13 (I:256) and *Harmony* 3.11 (II:281).
7. *On the Fall of the Devil* 12 (I:125).
8. Rogers, to her credit, realizes this fact, arguing that Anselm is chiefly concerned to develop an account of free choice that allows created agents “a measure of aseity” (see above, p. 49).
9. Rogers argues in a similar vein that Anselm secures ultimate responsibility in a way that Frankfurt fails to do. See Rogers, 2005, 264–266.
10. Rogers, 2005, 262–263.